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 In certain cases, states abandoned the concept of total state immunity, 
permitting certain claims against them by private parties in both domestic courts and 
a variety of international arbitral forums. A striking example of this trend is found in 
the area of investor-state dispute resolution, where states have consented to claims 
brought by foreign investors who allege mistreatment within the host state’s territory.1 
At the time of the emergence of investor state arbitration, such regulation of 
states was seen as necessary to protect Western investors from expropriation of their 
investments by developing states, in which there was an absence of rule of law and the 
protections that flow from that. 2 Such conditions have led to increased development 
globally in sectors included energy, mining, infrastructure, and other areas, where 
countries seek transfers of capital, knowledge, or technological resources from foreign 
partners. 3  
The ICSID Center was established primarily to ensure the availability of an 
assured impartial and independent dispute resolution service to first world investors 
who were generally unfamiliar with and, therefore, apprehensive of developing 
countries’ legal system. Under certain conditions, a party can submit a request for 
conciliation or arbitration under the ICSID Convention.4 While the ability of foreign 
                                                 
1 CHEN, L. An Introduction to Contemporary International Law. A Policy Oriented Perspective. Oxford 
University Press, 2015. ISBN: 978-0-19-022798-2, pg. 141.  
2 SUSLER, O., WILSON, T. Restoring Balance in Investor State Dispute Settlement: Addressing Treaty 
Shopping and Indirect Expropriation Claims and Consistent Approaches to Decision-Making. The 
International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management. Volume 84 Issue 1 
February 2018. ISSN: 0003-7877, pg. 39 
3 CHEN, L. Ibid.  
4 TAO, J. Arbitration Law and Practice in China. Wolters Kluwer International BV, The Netherlands, 





investors to choose investor state arbitration as a mechanism for settling investment 
disputes has gained relevance, it has also come under progressively more scrutiny. 5  
The increase in the number of cases over the years, together with sometimes 
expansive, unexpected and inconsistent interpretations of International Investment 
Agreement provisions by tribunals, had triggered a worldwide debate and a number of 
countries had adopted reform measures. 6  Those problems, subsequent measures and 
possible future development of investor state dispute mechanism needs to be set into 
the context of changes in the bilateral and multilateral conventions, and a possibility 
of introducing a new appellate mechanism or even an independent body of an 
international investment court.  
This thesis intends to provide answers to the question whether the international 
investment court is a viable possibility for the future of the investment arbitration and 
explore its advantages, problems, and possible alternatives.   
                                                 
5 POLANCO, R. The Rise of and Backlash against Investor–State Arbitration. In The Return of the 
Home State to Investor-State Disputes: Bringing Back Diplomatic Protection?  Cambridge 
University Press, 2019. oi:10.1017/9781108628983.003, pg. 46 
6 Improving Investment Dispute Settlement: UNCTAD Policy. IIA Issue Note, Issue 4, November 
2017.  [online]. [accessed on 17.3.2019]. available at 






The thesis is divided into the Introduction and Methodology, five Chapters and 
a Conclusion. Chapter 1 will introduce the sources of international investment law, 
with an emphasis on multilateral conventions and bilateral treaties, and their role in 
the international investment system.  Chapter 2 will focus on the ICSID Convention 
and ICSID Center, its structure and control mechanism that is currently in place. 
Chapter 3 will shortly introduce the most important dispute settlement mechanisms 
between investors and states and importantly a current proposal for Amendment of the 
ICSID Rules. It will describe the shift from the national court and diplomatic 
protection towards investment arbitration and describe alternative procedures, such as 
mediation. Chapter 4 will explore the most significant concerns of investors and states 
regarding the system of investment arbitration through arbitral jurisdiction and 
analysis of the negative consequences for the parties involved. Chapter 5 will introduce 
several possible changes in investor-state arbitration and examine their viability under 
the current system, e.g. an introduction of a new ICSID appellate mechanism, 
proposition of an investment court or methods of alternative dispute resolution. The 
Conclusion of this thesis will evaluate the development of the international investment 
law, and asses the viability of the newly introduced proposals. 
This thesis has a twofold goal. The first one is the description of the 
proceedings under the Washington Convention with an emphasis on the most 
significant problems that have emerged in the investor-state arbitration. The second 
goal is the analysis of the chosen approach, proposal of the independent investment 
court system and its alternatives. Method of analysis,  description, comparison as well 
as synthesis were used for the work. The sources used for this thesis were book 
publications by leading foreign experts, scientific articles and arbitration awards. The 







1. Sources of the International Investment Law 
 Today international investment law is not primarily or solely concerned with 
the private contractual relation between the foreign investor and the host state, but 
rather is principally founded on fundamental principles derived from international 
treaty law, and, to a lesser extent, on customary international law and general 
principles of law.7 The customary mechanisms, the bilateral treaties and the increase 
of regional arrangements have contributed to create a new jurisdiction of the world 
society. 8 
 The regime governing investment that will be mostly explored in this thesis is 
the international legal instrument granting protection to the foreign investor. This 
instrument usually takes the form of an international treaty, most often a bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT), occasionally a multilateral treaty, and increasingly 
preferential trade and investment agreements.9 Examples of treaties authorizing 
investor-state arbitration include the multilateral international conventions such as 
Global Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), as well as free trade agreements such as the 
NAFTA. 10  
 
1.1. Sector-based and Regional International Agreements 
The multilateral conventions are often focused on particular regions or 
economic sectors as is the case of ECT, the NAFTA or the ASEAN Investment 
                                                 
7 BRABANDERE, E., Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law. Procedural Aspects 
and Implications. Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2014. ISBN: 978-1-107-06687-
8, pg. 17 
8 CARMEN, R. L’ Évolution du droit international en matière d’investissements directs 
étrangers [online]. Université d’Auvergne Clermont-Ferrand I, 2007, [online]. [accessed on 
15.2.2019]. available at https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00717699, pg. 574 
9 BRABANDERE, E., Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law. Procedural Aspects 
and Implications. Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2014. ISBN: 978-1-107-06687-
8, pg. 25 
10 CHEN, L. An Introduction to Contemporary International Law. A Policy Oriented Perspective. 





agreement.11 This Section will briefly introduce some of the significant International 
Investment Agreements (IIA) and their role in the international investment system.  
 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States  
The Washington Convention12 forms the basis for the International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes ICSID¸that was founded by the World Bank in 
1966 in response to the demand for competent and efficient conciliation and arbitration 
services for the resolution of disputes between governments and foreign investors. 13 
This convention will be further examined in Chapter 3.  
 
European Energy Charter 
It is the most important multilateral treaty providing for Investor State 
Arbitration. The fundamental objective of the ECT’s provisions on investment is to 
ensure the creation of a “level playing field” for the energy sector, with the purpose of 
receding to a minimum the non-commercial risk associated with energy-sector 
investments. Today, the ECT has fifty-four members, including the European Union 
(EU), and fifty-two states have signed or acceded to it. Therefore, it is the world’s 
largest multilateral investment treaty in substantive issues. 14 
 Like other investment treaties, the ECT includes ICSID provisions, allowing 
the arbitration of disputes before ICSID tribunals or those constituted under the 
                                                 
11 BORN, G., International Arbitration, Cases and Materials. Kluwer Law International BV, The 
Netherlands, 2011, ISBN: 978-90-411-3458-5, pg. 40 
12 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
18 March 1965, 4 ILM 524 (1965) 
13 TAO, J. Arbitration Law and Practice in China. Wolters Kluwer International BV, The Netherlands, 
2008, ISBN: 978-90-411-2748-8, pg. 14 
14  POLANCO, R. The Rise of and Backlash against Investor–State Arbitration. In The Return of the 
Home State to Investor-State Disputes: Bringing Back Diplomatic Protection?  Cambridge 





UNCITRAL or the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) Arbitration Rules. Many 
disputes have been initiated on the basis of Article 26. 15 
 
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency  
The Convention went into effect on April 12, 1988. As compared to the 
difficulties faced in the 1960s and 1970s, this process was certainly aided by an 
increasingly welcoming attitude of many capital-importing countries towards, and, 
following the various debt crises, increasing need for, foreign investment. 16 The 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) is an international organization 
with independent legal personality and a capital-based corporate structure. Its 
headquarters are located in Washington DC. Being the youngest member of the World 
Bank Group, its objective is to promote foreign investment between its members by 
offering insurance against non-commercial risks to foreign private investors who 
invest in developing countries; by providing technical assistance for countries to 
develop strategies to promote investment; and by providing information about 






                                                 
15  POLANCO, R. The Rise of and Backlash against Investor–State Arbitration. In The Return of the 
Home State to Investor-State Disputes: Bringing Back Diplomatic Protection?  Cambridge 
University Press, 2019. oi:10.1017/9781108628983.003, pg. 35 
16 SCHILL, S., Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. [online] [accessed on 12.3.2019]. available at 
http://opil.ouplaw.com.ezproxy.is.cuni.cz/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e520?rskey=nhZzhE&result=1&prd=EPIL 
17 Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Convention [online] 







Arab Investment Convention 
The 1974 Arab Investment Convention 18 created a Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between host states of Arab Investments and Nationals of other 
Arab States, on organization very similar to ICSID, but with some differences as it was 
circumscribed to a specific type of claimants, provide for limited annulment rules (a 
second award rendered was considered final) and gave jurisdiction to the same Arab 
Centre for disputes over the interpretation and application of the Arab Investment 
Convention.19 The Arab multilateral treaty was superseded by the Unified Agreement 
for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States (1980)20 that provides for 
arbitration before the Arab Investment Court, which became operational only in 2003.  
 
1.2. Free Trade Agreements 
International free trade has become one of the central global issues of the 
21st century both in terms of fierce political debates and economic significance. The 
new US administration’s policy to call off the EU-US Free Trade Agreement – TTIP, 
cancel the TPP and renegotiate the NAFTA all prove that the exception of the new era 
has not been devoid of political upheavals.21 Today, investment protection has become 
an integral part of new generation free trade agreements, some of which are concluded 
between developed democracies. With this, the guarantee function against the 
                                                 
18 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between Host States of Arab Investments and 
Nationals of Other Arab States, 10 June 1974 (‘Arab Investment Convention’) The contracting 
states were Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, Syria, Kuwait, Egypt and Yemen; Libya and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) acceded later. 
19 POLANCO, R. The Rise of and Backlash against Investor–State Arbitration. In The Return of the 
Home State to Investor-State Disputes: Bringing Back Diplomatic Protection?  Cambridge 
University Press, 2019. oi:10.1017/9781108628983.003, pg. 33 
20 Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States, 26 November 1980. The 
agreement has been ratified by all member states of the League of Arab States except Algeria and 
the Comoros. 
21 NAGY, V. Free Trade, Public Interest and Reality: New Generation Free Trade Agreements and 
National Regulatory Sovereignty. In BELOHLÁVEK, A. Czech Yearbook of International Law. 





insufficient legal protection in the developing countries was put into the shade and 
investment protection law fully detached from its original raison d'être. 22 
 
North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA 
After some time, investment and related arbitral provisions were also included 
in some free trade agreements, such as NAFTA. Chapter 11 of NAFTA provides for 
standards of protection to Canadian, Mexican, and US investors investing in one of 
these States and allows those investors to commence arbitration if they believe those 
standards are not respected. It provides for the possibility of seizing ICSID and 
provides additional guarantees: the binding force and enforceability of the award 
rendered by the arbitral tribunals.  23 
 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership TTIP 
TTIP was a proposed trade agreement between the EU and the United States, 
with the aim of promoting trade and multilateral economic growth which eventually 
failed to materialize. It is one of the largest bilateral trade initiative ever being 
negotiated, not only because it involves the two largest economies in the world, but 
also because of its potential global reach in setting an example for future partners and 
agreements. The European Commission’s TTIP team met the US government’s 
negotiators on multiple occasions. They exchanged written proposals on TTIP and 
draft treaty texts in consultation with stakeholders. All EU text proposals are public. 24  
                                                 
22 NAGY, V. Free Trade, Public Interest and Reality: New Generation Free Trade Agreements and 
National Regulatory Sovereignty. In BELOHLÁVEK, A. Czech Yearbook of International Law. 
Lex Lata, Netherlands, 2018. ISBN: 978-90-824603-7-7, pg. 206 
23 DELANEY J., MAGRAW, B. Procedural Transparency. The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law. 2008.  DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199231386.013.0019, pg.  741-750 
24 TTIP – a trade agreement between the European Union and the United States. Government of the 






Due to increasing resistance, especially in Western European countries, to 
negotiations with the United States, where investment protection and the ISDS 
mechanism have become one of the most criticized parts, the Commission announced 
a suspension of investment negotiations in June 2014 and announced a public 
consultation on the TTIP investment chapter and almost 150 000 responses were 
received. 25 In November 2015, the Commission presented a proposal for a final 
version in which the ISDS section underwent a radical change. It was replaced by a 
new mechanism that will be further discussed in Chapter 5.3. 
 
Trans Pacific Partnership TPP/CPTPP 
While the US withdrew from the TPP on 21 January 2017, thus bringing to an 
end the prospect of the twelve-nation trade deal that had originally been envisaged, 
the TPP is now being pursued by the remaining eleven nations26 in the form of a 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), 
with a view to maintaining the balance seen to be inherent in the TPP and protecting 
state rights to regulate. 27 
On December 30, 2018 the CPTPP entered into force among the first six 
countries to ratify the agreement – Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, 
and Singapore. On January 14, 2019, the CPTPP entered into force for Vietnam.28 
While the EU approach and specifically assessed by CETA represent a break 
with traditional ISDS, this mechanism is a solid part of other regional multilateral 
                                                 
25 SVOBODA, O. Investment Court System: European Union's Abrupt Divorce with Investment 
Arbitrage. Právník 4/2019, Prague, AV ČR. ISSN: 0231-6625, pg. 393 
26 The countries concerned are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. 
27 SUSLER, O., WILSON, T. Restoring Balance in Investor State Dispute Settlement: Addressing 
Treaty Shopping and Indirect Expropriation Claims and Consistent Approaches to Decision-
Making. The International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management. Volume 
84 Issue 1 February 2018. ISSN: 0003-7877, pg.  38 







initiatives, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Transparency Agreement 
(CPTPP). These contradictory visions lead the ISDS to a historic intersection.29 
 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement CETA 
 CETA is a progressive free trade agreement which covers virtually all sectors 
and aspects of Canada-EU trade in order to eliminate or reduce barriers. For example, 
prior to CETA’s entry into force, only 25 percent of EU tariff lines on Canadian goods 
were duty-free. With CETA, 98 percent of EU tariff lines are now duty-free for 
Canadian goods.30 Some believe that the recent developments suggest that the 
internationalization of free trade cannot be halted. Though after a tumultuous process, 
the CETA was signed.31 CETA is currently applied on a provisional basis, as the 
ratification by the individual EU Member States is still pending.  
The European Parliament gave its consent to CETA on 15 February 2017. 
Pending Member States’ ratification, mixed agreements are applied provisionally. The 
Council adopted a decision on provisional application on 28 October 2016. This took 
effect on 21 September 2017 and applies to the majority of CETA provisions, except 
for a few related mainly to investment.32 Areas that are not yet in force are investment 
protection, investment market access for portfolio investment (but market access for 
                                                 
29 SVOBODA, O. Investment Court System: European Union's Abrupt Divorce with Investment 
Arbitrage. Právník 4/2019, Prague, AV ČR. ISSN: 0231-6625, pg. 404 
30 CETA: A progressive trade agreement. Government of Canada. [online]. [accessed on 20.3.2019]. 
available at https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/campaign-campagne/ceta-
aecg/index.aspx?lang=eng 
31 NAGY, V. Free Trade, Public Interest and Reality: New Generation Free Trade Agreements and 
National Regulatory Sovereignty. In BELOHLÁVEK, A. Czech Yearbook of International Law. 
Lex Lata, Netherlands, 2018. ISBN: 978-90-824603-7-7, pg. 198 







foreign direct investment is an exclusive EU competence) and the Investment Court 
System.33 
  
1.3. Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 Bilateral investment treaties or investment protection agreements became 
Common during the 1980s and 1990s as a means of encouraging capital investment in 
developing markets. Capital exporting states (including the United States, most 
Eastern European states, and Japan) were the earliest and most vigorous proponents of 
the negotiation of BITs, principally with countries in developing regions. More 
recently, states from all regions of the world and in all stages of development have 
entered into BITs. 34  The initial purpose of these treaties was to project certain 
constitutional requirements to the level of international disciplines. There was no 
global agreement and especially no uniformity as to the investment protection 
standards. The major turning point was when even developed democracies started to 
give concluding bilateral investment treaties.35 
Since the first BIT was signed by Germany and Pakistan in 195936, more than 
2500 such treaties had been listed with the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).37 This BIT provided for a dispute settlement mechanism in 
the event of disputes as to the interpretation or application of the treaty, specifying 
consultation between the state parties for the purpose of finding a solution in a spirit 
of friendship. If no solution was possible, the dispute was to be submitted to the ICJ if 
                                                 
33 CETA Explained. European Comission [online]. [accessed on 20.3.2019]. available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-explained/index_en.htm 
34  BORN, G., International Arbitration, Cases and Materials. Kluwer Law International BV, The 
Netherlands, 2011, ISBN: 978-90-411-3458-5, pg. 40 
35 NAGY, V. Free Trade, Public Interest and Reality: New Generation Free Trade Agreements and 
National Regulatory Sovereignty. In BELOHLÁVEK, A. Czech Yearbook of International Law. 
Lex Lata, Netherlands, 2018. ISBN: 978-90-824603-7-7, pg. 206 
36 BIT Germany - Pakistan (1959), signed on 25 November 1959 
37 CHEN, L. An Introduction to Contemporary International Law. A Policy Oriented Perspective. 





both parties so agreed, or to an ad hoc arbitration tribunal upon the request of either 
parties. This model of dispute settlement was largely superseded after the rise of 
investment treaties with investor state arbitration provisions. 38 
 Most BITs provide significant substantive protections for investments made by 
foreign investors, including guarantees against expropriation and denials of fair and 
equitable treatments. BIT also frequently contain provisions that permit foreign 
investors to require international arbitration, typically referred to as „investor-state 
arbitrations“ of specified categories of investment disputes with the host state – 
including the absence of a traditional contractual arbitration agreement with the host 
state. 39   
 The types of claims permitted under bilateral investment treaties include unfair 
treatment vis-à-vis domestic competitors, and arbitrary or unjust treatment by an 
instrumentality of the host state. 40The specific provision for ICSID arbitration is may, 
however, vary. For example, China has notified the ICSID that the Chinese 
government will only consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICSID disputes 
over compensation resulting from expropriation and nationalization under Article 
25(4)41.   However, since a large portion of all cases brought before the ICSID over 
the years have in fact demanded compensation for nationalization and expropriation, 
China has not effectively eliminated the protection of the Convention.42 
                                                 
38 POLANCO, R. The Rise of and Backlash against Investor–State Arbitration. In The Return of the 
Home State to Investor-State Disputes: Bringing Back Diplomatic Protection?  Cambridge 
University Press, 2019. oi:10.1017/9781108628983.003, pg. 32 
39 BORN, G., International Arbitration, Cases and Materials. Kluwer Law International BV, The 
Netherlands, 2011, ISBN: 978-90-411-3458-5, pg. 40  
40 CHEN, L. An Introduction to Contemporary International Law. A Policy Oriented Perspective. 
Oxford University Press, 2015. ISBN: 978-0-19-022798-2, pg. 142 
41 This article provides that any contracting state may, at the time of ratification, acceptance, or approval 
of the convention or at any time thereafter notify the ICSID of the class or classes of disputes that 
it will or will not consider submitting to ICSID jurisdiction. 
42 TAO, J. Arbitration Law and Practice in China. Wolters Kluwer International BV, The Netherlands, 





 In addition to securing such grounds for investors, BITs may require certain 
actions of contracting states designed to encourage free trade or to promote other 
policy objectives. For example, a model BIT adopted by the U.S. government in 2012 
includes provisions regarding environmental and labor standards, in addition to 
measures to encourage regulatory transparency within adopting states. 43 
 The possibility of „arbitration without privity“44 is an important option in some 
international disputes and represents a substantial development in the evolution of 
international arbitration. In addition, many BITs contain provisions dealing with the 
finality and enforceability of international arbitration awards, issued pursuant to the 
treaty. 45 Since many states have developed „model“ investment treaties and 
considering that the majority of the provisions on the protection of foreign investment 
are present in all modern BITs, there is certain uniformity both in the content and 
structure of BITs. The vast majority of contemporary BITs contain a dispute settlement 
clause granting foreign investors direct access to an international arbitral. 46 
2. ICSID 
2.1. Washington Convention  
In the early 1960s, the World Bank began to work on an alternative approach 
to the settlement of investment disputes. The result of around four years of negotiations 
was the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes establishing the 
                                                 
43 CHEN, L. An Introduction to Contemporary International Law. A Policy Oriented Perspective. 
Oxford University Press, 2015. ISBN: 978-0-19-022798-2, pg. 142 
44 Jan Paulsson coined the phrase "Arbitration without privity" to express a paradigm shift in the nature 
of arbitral consent. Although arbitration is always consensual, the typical model – in which the 
parties agree to arbitrate their disputes – now coexists with other models in which consent is 
established through a complex, multi-stepped process. This will be further examined in Chapter 3.  
45 BORN, G., International Arbitration, Cases and Materials. Kluwer Law International BV, The 
Netherlands, 2011, ISBN: 978-90-411-3458-5, pg. 40  
46 BRABANDERE, E. Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law. Procedural Aspects 
and Implications. Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2014. ISBN: 978-1-107-06687-





International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 47 Other 
arbitration rules and institutions were already in place or soon would be, though they 
did not specifically focus on arbitrations by investors against States. The ICSID 
Convention provides investors with an avenue to initiate an arbitration against the State 
not only for a breach of contract, but for a breach of any legal instrument, including 
contract, treaty, or even national investment law, that provides for the resolution of 
investment disputes by arbitration under the Convention.48 By the mid-1970s, the 
inclusion of ICSID arbitration clauses was a common feature in investment contracts, 
and a dozen domestic investment promotion law were enacted with reference to the 
ICSID Convention. 49 
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) was 
established on 14 October 1966 to provide facilities for the conciliation and arbitration 
of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states.50 ICSID Center is 
the most transparent of the commonly used international arbitration institutions and 
rules. The facilities were established under the auspices of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 51  
ICSID does not itself conciliate or arbitrate investment disputes. Rather, 
conciliation commissions and arbitral tribunals may be constituted for particular 
disputes in accordance with the provisions of the ICSID Convention. The ICSID 
Secretariat maintains the Panels of Conciliators and Arbitrators and provides 
                                                 
47 POLANCO, R. The Rise of and Backlash against Investor–State Arbitration. In The Return of the 
Home State to Investor-State Disputes: Bringing Back Diplomatic Protection?  Cambridge 
University Press, 2019. oi:10.1017/9781108628983.003, pg. 32 
48 DELANEY J., MAGRAW, B. Procedural Transparency. The Oxfor Handbook of International 
Investment Law. 2008.  DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199231386.013.0019, pg.  725 
49 POLANCO, R. The Rise of and Backlash against Investor–State Arbitration. In The Return of the 
Home State to Investor-State Disputes: Bringing Back Diplomatic Protection?  Cambridge 
University Press, 2019. oi:10.1017/9781108628983.003, pg. 32 
50 ICSID Convention Article 25(1).  
51 TAO, J. Arbitration Law and Practice in China. Wolters Kluwer International BV, The Netherlands, 





institutional support to the initiation and conduct of conciliation and arbitration 
proceedings under the Convention. In essence, the ICSID Convention provides, inter 
alia, for a „self-contained“ framework for the arbitration of investment disputes, 
including provisions on the initiation and conduct of arbitration proceedings, the 
recognition and enforcement of awards, and the interpretation, revision, and annulment 
of awards. 52  
The ICSID Secretariat maintains a register containing notices of intent to file 
an arbitral claim, notices of arbitration, and other important documents relating to 
disputes. The full register is not online but can be accessed by contacting the 
Secretariat's office directly. ICSID also posts the most recent development in each case 
on its website, regularly updating each case.53 
Demand for ICSID's dispute resolution services continued to grow in 2018 with 
a record 56 new registered cases, according to the latest edition of the bi-annual ICSID 
Caseload—Statistics. The 2018 figure surpasses the previous year's record of 53 
registered cases. Overall, ICSID has administered 706 cases since the first was 
registered in 1972. Notably, ICSID has also seen growth in the number of cases 
administered under other sets of rules, such as those of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). In total, ICSID provided services for 20 
cases governed by non-ICSID rules in 2018, compared to 13 the previous year. Fifteen 
of these cases applied the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.54 
 
2.2. Jurisdiction  
The principal  provision regarding the jurisdiction of the Centre is article 25(1) of 
the ICSID Convention: The jurisdiction of the Centre extends to any legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent 
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sub-division or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that state) 
and a national or another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent 
in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party 
may withdraw its consent unilaterally. 55 
The concept of jurisdiction encompasses the existence of a cause of action under 
an investment agreement, in addition to a valid legal dispute (ratione materiae); an 
examination as to whether the agreement covers the parties at hand (ratione personae); 
the existence of consent; as well as any preconditions that may need to be satisfied 
before submitting a dispute to arbitration, such as the exhaustion of local remedies. 56 
The term „national of another Contracting State “ covers both natural and juridical 
persons.  The Rules Governing the Additional Facility have expanded the application 
of ICSID’s facilities so as to include parties that do not meet the jurisdictional 
requirement of the ICSID Convention. 57  
The 1965 Report on the ICSID Convention said, that the dispute must consent the 
existence or scope of a legal right or obligation, or the nature or extent of the reparation 
to be made for breach of a legal obligation“.58 Upon ratification of the Conventions, 
states may notify ICSID of the classes of investment disputes that they would or would 
not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. 59 
 
2.3. Protected investment  
 One of the key features distinguishing commercial from investment arbitration 
is the precise nature of the activity under consideration. The protections and guarantees 
contained in BITs and international investment agreements are only affordable to 
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“investments”. 60 Direct investment is based on an economic definition. Under this 
definition, foreign direct investment is formally defined as ownership of property by a 
foreign resident to control the use of that property.61 Although a number of definitions 
of „investment“ were considered at the time of the negotiation of the ICSID 
Convention, none was agreed upon „given the essential requirement of consent by the 
parties“.62 It is left to the parties to determine which types of investments they wish to 
bring to ICSID.63 Given that the contract between the investor and the host state will 
not specify whether the undertaking, or parts thereof, qualify as investments, this has 
to be assessed by reference to an applicable international agreement or the host state’s 
domestic laws, if any. 64 
On one view, the fact that the Convention does not offer any definition should 
not be interpreted as allowing parties to define any operation as an „investment. That 
view suggests that the requirement of an investment is constitutional in nature under 
the Convention and has an objective meaning. Investment treaties typically define the 
term „investment“. The term „investment“ may also be defines by the law of the host 
State. 65 A number of ICSID tribunals have elaborated upon the definition of 
„investment“ for the purposes of art. 25. In Salini v. Morocco66, the tribunals referred 
to certain criteria implicated by the concept of investment, including a certain duration, 
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regularity of profit and return, assumption of risk, substantial commitment, and a 
contribution to the economic development of the host state.  
This approach has been followed by a number of other tribunals. Others, 
however, have treated it with more caution, with the tribunal in Biwater Gauff 
v Tanzania67 observing that there was no basis for „overly strict“ application of the 
five Salini criteria in every case. The tribunal observed that strict application of such 
criteria „risks arbitrary exclusion of certain types of transaction from the scope of the 
Convention “. While foreign investment scholarship and case law suggests that the 
concept of “investment” requires the Salini criteria, contemporary BITs no longer 
place such limitation. 68 It is clear that, even if one accepts there criteria as relevant, 
their presence has to be evaluated in the entire circumstances of a given case. The 
terms in which the parties agreed that a given investment should be subject to the 
Centre’s jurisdiction are of primordial importance. Going beyond, or against, the 
parties’ agreement in that regard must be highly exceptional, if possible, at all. 69 
 
2.4. Consent to jurisdiction and applicable law 
The ICSID arbitration and conciliation rules provide that ICSID jurisdiction 
will be established once the parties to the dispute have voluntarily consented to submit 
to the ICSID for arbitration and/or conciliation. Once the consent has been given, the 
ICSID will have jurisdiction unless all the parties to the dispute agree to withdraw their 
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consent.70  Neither party may revoke its consent unilaterally.71 States, when expressing 
consent to direct investment arbitration, may condition their consent and, for example, 
require foreign investors to exhaust local remedies, either generally or for a limited 
time period, or insert a „for-in-the-road“ clause which obliges investors to choose 
between international arbitration or domestic courts. 72 
Consent to investment arbitration may be exhibited in three independent ways, 
namely by express stipulation in a contract between the host state and the foreign 
investor; by reference to a provision in the law (usually a foreign investment-related 
law) of the host state; and by express or implicit stipulation in a BIT or international 
investment agreement. 73 
 
Express stipulation in a contract 
Dispute resolution may be authorized by agreements between an entity and the 
host state as a condition of an investment. 74 Such consent can relate to future disputes 
or to a dispute that has already arisen. 75 Some tribunals have considered, based on the 
broad language contained in BIT dispute settlement class, that the foreign investor can 
bring claims for contract breaches against a state before an international tribunal.  This 
may be as noted by the Ad Hoc Committee in Vivendi I: „whether there has been a 
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breach of the BIT and whether there has been a breach of contract are different 
questions. Each of these claims will be determined by reference to its own proper or 
applicable law – in the case of the BIT, by international law; in the case of the 
concession contract, by the proper law of the contract. 76  
 
Reference to a provision in the law 
A second method is a special arbitration provision in the national law of the 
host State.  The legal provision containing the host State’s offer to arbitration must be 
in force at the time of its acceptance by the investor.  
 
Stipulation in a BIT or international investment agreement 
Many states have given consent to ICSID arbitration in investment treaties. 
Treaty based investment arbitrations currently outnumber contract-based arbitrations 
under the ICSID Convention. 77 Such treaties generally provide investors that qualify 
as a national of the other state broad guarantees against unfair and discriminatory 
treatment, expropriation, and currency transfer restrictions. This type of general 
consent to ICSID arbitration has also been included in the investment provisions of 
several multilateral treaties, including the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the Energy Charter Treater.78 In these cases, the arbitration provision 
represents only an offer of the host State to arbitration. In order to perfect the consent, 
the investor must accept the State’s offer. The investor may accept the offer by simply 
instituting arbitration. 79 
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For those cases registered in 2018, bilateral investment treaties were the 
primary instrument invoked (57%), followed by investment contracts between the 
investor and the host-State (17%), and the Energy Charter Treaty (10%). Other 
international treaties accounted for the remaining 16%.80 
Contract, treaty, or domestic legislation will specify, although perhaps not, the 
applicable governing law. Host states will naturally make every effort to put forward 
their domestic law, whereas investors will strive to be bound by a neutral law, such as 
lex mercatoria or general international law, or if the host’s domestic law is unavoidable 
(presumably under pressure they will endeavor to insert suitable stabilization clauses. 
They effectively freeze the ability of the host state to undertake any legislative changes 
that produce legal effects on the terms of an agreement with an investor. 81 
 
2.5. Control mechanism 
Given the denationalized character of administered internationalized investment 
arbitration, there is naturally no appeal to local courts, nor set aside proceedings, as is 
otherwise the case with commercial arbitration. Under this principle of judicial non-
intervention, national courts will not review procedural orders or decisions of 
arbitrators. 82 Due to the fact that the system excludes any judicial recourse, a minimal 
control mechanism was required in order to ensure the legitimacy of the arbitration 
process. For this reason, the post-award remedies were included. 83 
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An ad hoc Committee is not a court of appeal. Yet being a mainly self-contained 
regime, ICSID’s effectiveness requires a functioning internal control mechanism.  The 
ICSID review system poses balance to the automatic recognition and enforcement of 
ICSID awards within the boundaries of the Contracting States and prohibition of any 
diplomatic protection. 84 
A general condition for exerting any of the four remedies provided by the 
Convention is that the awards must be final. Preliminary decisions such as maintaining 
jurisdiction, cannot be subject to the remedy of annulment, since allowing such 
measures would seriously delay the whole proceedings.85 The ICSID annulment 
mechanism was initially criticized, on the grounds that it permits unduly extensive 
appellate review, as well as possibilities for political influence; more recent 
commentary and experience has been generally favorable. 86 
When a party challenges an ICSID award, the Convention empowers the 
Chairman of the Administrative Council of ICSID to appoint an ad hoc committee to 
review, and possibly to annul, awards; if an award is annulled it may be resubmitted 
to a new arbitral tribunal.87 The drafter’s intention to ensure the finality of an award 
can be seen from the choice of remedies offered by the ICSID Convention. In this 
respect, the only way to review an award is pursuant to the five specific remedies 
provided by the Convention, namely: 88 
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(i) Rectification (Article 49) – The Tribunal can rectify any clerical, arithmetical or 
similar error in its award. 
(ii) Supplementary decision (Article 49) – The Tribunal may interpret its award where 
there is a dispute between the parties as to the meaning or scope of the award rendered. 
(iii) Revision (Article 51) – The Tribunal may revise its award on the basis of a newly 
discovered fact of such a nature as to decisively affect the award. 
(iv) Annulment (Article 52) – An ad hoc Committee may fully or partially annul an 
award on the basis of one or more expressly and restrictively specified grounds.  
 
Rectification 
The standard for rectification has been asses by the Tribunal of Gold Reserve 
who found that the purpose of the correction exception is to correct obvious omissions 
or mistakes and avoid a consequence where a party finds itself bound by an award that 
orders relief the tribunal did not intent to grant. The purpose is therefore to ensure that 
the true intentions of the tribunal are given effect in the award, but not to alter those 
intentions, and the legal analysis, modify reasoning or alter finding. Any purported 
correction that goes beyond the scope of the Tribunal’s limited mandate in this regard 
is likely to be subject to challenge. 89 
 
Interpretation 
The essential prerequisite for the application for interpretation is the existence 
of a dispute about the cope and meaning of the award with some practical significance 
to the award’s execution. A sheer argument concerning theoretical suggestions about 
the clarity of the award would not suffice for a successful application. This request is 
not time-limited with regard to the long-lasting investor – host State relations. It seems 
reasonable to submit the application to the very same tribunal that has rendered the 
original award 90. However, the precondition is the express willingness of the members 
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of the tribunal to take part in the procedure. The accessibility of the original tribunal 
becomes more complicated with the lapse of time. Therefore, the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules 51(2) provide for the constitution of a new Tribunal. 91  
 
Revision 
The contingency of revision is always dependent on the new element of law or 
fact discovered which has objectively existed at the time of signature and transmission 
of the award. The new fact, however, must be decisive, it follows that it shall be able 
to change the award substantially, for example, the calculation of the damages or even 
matters relating to the jurisdiction. 92 The right for application is time-limited for the 
parties barred by a subjective and an objective term of performance. The applicant 
shall make his request for revision within 90 days after the finding the decisive fact; 
but no later than three years after the date the award was dispatched to the parties.93 
 
2.6. Annulment  
 Annulment is a safeguard mechanism that protects the integrity of the law 
contained without addressing issues of substantive accuracy of awards. It is an 
exceptional remedy designed for specific causes. The aim of annulment is to nullify 
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and invalidate an arbitral award.94 Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention provides just 
five conditions under which the ad hoc Committee may annul a tribunal’s award. 95  
 
(a) The Tribunal was not properly constituted. This ground is rarely invoked. 
Questions may arise from dissatisfaction in the manner in which challenges to 
arbitrators and alleged conflicts of interest have been handled. 96 
(b) The Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its power. This includes a situation 
when a tribunal lacks competences. As stated in the ICSID Background Paper on 
Annulment, an ad hoc Committee could only annul an award for manifest excess 
powers related to jurisdiction if it is obvious, clear or self-evident, without the need 
for an elaborate analysis of the decisions.97 Another example is a complete failure to 
apply the law to which a Tribunal is directed by Art. 42(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
If the derogation is manifest, it entails a manifest excess of power. 98 
(c) There was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal. It is a serious 
problem. However, as stated by the World Bank, no case of corruption has ever been 
alleged in any of the annulment proceedings that have led to published decision. 99 
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(d) There has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure. 
The ad hoc Committee in Total S.A. v Argentine Republic100 stated that the violations 
may relate to the following: suitable opportunity for rebuttal, the right of defense, 
equality between the parties, deliberation among the members of the tribunal, the 
independence and impartiality of the members of the tribunal, and the proper handling 
of evidence and allocation of the burden of proof.  
(e) The award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based. The ad hoc 
Committee in its decision in case CMS Gas Transmissions Company v Argentine 
Republic101 pointed out that annulment under the stated ground should only occur in a 
clear case. There should be two conditions: first, the failure to state reasons must leave 
the decision on a particular point essentially lacking in any expressed rationale; and 
second, that point must itself be necessary to the tribunal’s decision.  
It should be noted that the grounds for annulment are exhaustive and restrictive. 
The most frequently used grounds for annulment of arbitral awards are improper 
constitution of the tribunal, manifest excess of power and failure to state reasons. 102 
 
Procedure of annulment  
The annulment constitutes a very limited exception to the principle of finality, 
thus being concerned only with the legitimacy of the process and not with the 
substantive suitability. To initiate the annulment procedure, any or both parties 
(separately or jointly) must file an application with the ICSID Secretary-General. This 
right can be waived after rendering the award, but this waiver must be done 
explicitly.103 The application must identify the award to which it relates, indicate the 
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date of the application, state in detail the grounds on which it is based pursuant to 
Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention and be accompanied by the payment of a fee 
for lodging the application.104  
An application to annul an award will be referred to a three-member ad hoc 
committee appointed by the Chairman of the Administrative Council. The committee 
members must be drawn from the Panel of Arbitrators with limitations on who may 
become a member of a Tribunal.105 There is no comparable annulment procedure under 
the Additional Facility Rules. 106  
The fee for lodging an application for annulment is currently USD 25 000. The 
application must be files within 120 day after the date on which the award was 
rendered. In case of corruption on the part of a Tribunal ember, 129 days after 
discovery of the corruption, and in any event within three years after the date on which 
the award was rendered. 107 
In practice, few investor-state arbitral awards have been annulled under the ICSID 
system, although an increasing number of cases have been appealed under Article 52 
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over the past decade. 108 Some believe that the small number of annulments may speak 
to the quality and finality of ICSID tribunals for the settlement of disputes. 109 
 
3. Dispute settlement mechanisms between investors and states 
3.1. National Courts and Diplomatic protection 
Under traditional international law, nation-states were held to be immune from 
claims by private parties. Until the last few decades, an individual or corporation 
investing in a State could not bring a claim against that State in an international forum 
alleging a breach of international law unless that right was expressly granted by the 
host State to the investor, which was an extremely rare occurrence.110  Conventionally 
available dispute settlement mechanisms, in this case the domestic courts of the host 
state coupled with the possibility of the home state of the investor being able to resort 
to diplomatic protection, is of limited usefulness to settle investment disputes. 111  
In those circumstances where private claims are settled on the international 
level through the exercise of diplomatic protection, the individual is nevertheless first 
required to exhaust all local remedies available in the host state.112 From the 
perspective of the foreign investor, the obligation to submit disputes with the host state 
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to the domestic courts of that state is, for reasons related to a perceived fear of lack of 
independence or bias of these tribunals, not attractive. Even the resort to diplomatic 
protection is a cumbersome, lengthy and uncertain procedure. 113 
 Customary law for the protection of aliens is well developed. Influenced by 
Emmerich de Vittel’s theory that an injury to a national abroad is an injury to the state 
of nationality, traditional international law regards a state’s competence to protect its 
nationals as independent of the individual’s interest, the state thus enjoys discretion 
whether to espouse claims on behalf of its nationals at the international level. 114 The 
home state of the foreign investor can’t then „espouse the claim“ of its national and 
bring a claim under international law against the host state. The state of the individual’s 
nationality is acting in the right to see the law respected for its nationals. The conflict 
between the foreign investor and the host state is transformed into an interstate conflict 
between the host state and the state of nationality of the foreign investor. The 
individual therefore has no right to diplomatic protection and is thus dependent on the 
political discretion of its government. 115 
As noted by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case: „Within the limits 
prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by 
whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks for, for it is its own right that the State 
is asserting. The State must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection 
will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. It retains in this 
respect a discretionary power.“116 
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The inclusion of arbitration provisions in some concession contracts and 
investment agreements between individual or corporate investors and the host State 
provided an avenue for claims to be brought by the foreign investor directly against 
the host State. The entity against whom the investor can bring an arbitration depends 
on the terms and on its parties: as the host State is not always a party to the agreement, 
the arbitration is brought against the State entity or a State-owned or partly owned 
company that is a party to the Agreement.117 
The rise of investor-state arbitration is a process that started with the making 
of the ICSID Convention concluded in 1965, an agreement that was slowly followed 
by consent to arbitrate investor-state disputes in bilateral investment treaties concluded 
in the late 1960s and 1970s. Only by the end of the 1980s dud the number of BITs 
containing investor-state dispute settlement provisions increased dramatically. In the 
mid-1990s, investment chapters providing for investor-state arbitration started to be 
included in certain free trade agreements, following the example of the NAFTA.118 
Aggrieved investors may bring claims in forum such as ICSID. Other Common 
arbitration forums include the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and International Chamber of 
Commerce. Importantly, although the designated forum will provide the rules and 
institutional Framework governing a particular arbitration, the proceedings may take 
place nearly anywhere in the world. 119 
As noted by the ICSID Arbitral Tribunal in Maffezini v Spain. „International 
arbitration and other dispute settlement arrangement have replaced these older and 
frequently abusive practices of the past. These modern developments are essential, 
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however, to the protection of the rights envisaged under the pertinent treaties; they 
are also closely linked to the material aspects of the treatment accorded. 120 
In comparison with diplomatic protection, arbitration has several benefits for the 
claimant: the investor (and not the home state) has the procedural right to institute 
arbitration and has exclusive control of the claim; and if the damages are awarded, 
they are calculated without considering inter-state concerns, and paid directly to the 
individual claimant. 121 Because, there is no automatic access to an international 
dispute settlement mechanism, even when foreign investors are given direct rights 
under a certain treaty, the express consent of the states is required, as is the case in 
general international law. 122 
 
3.3. Mediation or Conciliation 
Mediation is frequently likened to conciliation. In fact, both the ECT Guide123 
and PCA Conciliation Rules124 specifically use “mediation” and “conciliation” 
interchangeably. While these two forms of dispute settlement are similar, they are not 
entirely identical. One key difference is their level of institutionalization, and the 
extent to which the third party is empowered to suggest terms of settlement. Mediation 
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is easier to distinguish from arbitration and judicial settlement. Mediation is typically 
facilitative, rather than evaluative,  “interests-based” rather than a “rights-based", and 
likely to be less formal, placing emphasis upon communication between the parties.125 
The concept of finding amicable solutions is not new, it is found in many 
multilateral investment treaties, often referred to as the "amicable settlement period" 
or "cooling-off period".  For example, Article 10.15 of the Central American Free 
Trade Agreement states that "the claimant and the respondent should initially seek to 
resolve the [investment] dispute through consultation and negotiation, which may 
include the use of non-binding, third-party procedures such as conciliation and 
mediation." Article 26 of the Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common 
Investment Area126 requires a six-month cooling off period, during which the parties 
"shall seek the assistance of a mediator", unless an alternative method of dispute 
settlement is agreed upon.127 
 
3.4. ICSID Arbitration and Conciliation 
Under the Convention, ICSID provides facilities for conciliation and 
arbitration of investment disputes between contracting states and individuals and 
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One of the most unique characteristics of the ICSID arbitration system is its 
autonomous nature. ICSID arbitration is known as self-contained arbitration because 
local courts in any particular State have no role in the ICSID proceedings.128 
Arbitration governed by the Washington Convention is therefore hold under the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules and the Additional Facility Rules that contain all the necessary 
provisions required for the arbitration of disputes.129  The difference is the fact that the 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules provide for arbitration in the circumstance where only 
the State of the investor or the respondent State is a party to the ICSID Convention. 
The ICSID Arbitration Additional Facility Rules are very similar to the ICSID Rules 
of Procedure quoted above. 130 The latest amendments of the Additional Facility Rules 
adopted by the Administrative Council of the Centre came into effect on April 10, 
2006.131 As in past years, the majority of new cases were instituted under the ICSID 
Convention Arbitration Rules (49 cases), followed by the Additional Facility Rules 
(six cases) and the ICSID Convention Conciliation Rules (one case).132 
 The arbitration commences with the submission of the request for arbitration. 
It shall be addressed to the Secretary-General who may register or refuse the request. 
As soon as possible after the registration, the Tribunal of a single arbiter or of uneven 
number of arbitrators is constituted. Once the tribunal has been formed, the arbitration 
shall be carried under the provisions of the ICSID Convention. The award is rendered 
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by the majority of votes and shall deal with every question submitted to the Tribunal 
and shall state the reasons upon which it is based. 133  
The parties to ICSID arbitration will typically rely on the ICSID Convention, as 
well as ICSID’s Arbitration Rules. Article 44 of the ICSID Convention allows parties, 
if they so agree, to choose other procedural rules. 134 The Secretary-General of ICSID 
also in certain circumstances acts as the appointing authority of arbitrators for ad hoc 
arbitrations. This has mostly been done in the context of agreements providing for 
arbitration under the 1976 Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law.135 
The internationalized nature of investment tribunals means that they are not 
bound by the judgment or decision of a national court pertinent to the arbitral 
proceedings under consideration and under the same cause of action. As a result, 
ICSID tribunals possess competence-competence jurisdiction to decide all matters 
falling within the sphere of the case at their disposal, constrained no doubt by the 
ICSID Convention and the terms of the parties’ agreements (BIT, contract and, or, 
national legislation). 136An award must be recognized by all ICSID Contracting States 
and pecuniary obligations imposed by an award are enforceable as a final judgment of 
the courts of a Contracting State. Due to the self-contained, de-localized nature of the 
system the only means of appeal available against an ICSID award are the remedies 
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 The ICSID Convention and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules also envision 
the settlement of investment disputes through conciliation proceedings. ICSID 
conciliation and arbitration have a number of similarities. First, consent to ICSID 
conciliation or arbitration is binding upon the parties and may not be withdrawn 
unilaterally. While the drafters decided to create largely identical systems, there are, 
given the nature of the proceedings, considerable differences between the conciliation 
and arbitration frameworks. The most notable one is reflected in the functions and 
powers of conciliation commissions and arbitral tribunals. 138 
In contrast to an arbitral tribunal, which is empowered to decide a dispute in 
accordance with the applicable law, the role of a conciliation commission is to clarify 
the disputed issues and assist the parties in reaching a settlement. The conciliation 
commission is to issue a non-binding report which may contain recommendations for 
settlement. 139 
A party commences a conciliation under the ICSID Convention by submitting a 
request for conciliation to the Secretary-General. The conditions for access to ICSID 
are contained in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. There may be further conditions 
in the instrument containing the parties’ consent to conciliation. As soon as a party has 
filed a request for conciliation with the prescribed lodging fee, ICSID sends the request 
to the other party and reviews the request to determine whether it can be registered. 
This screening process is mandated by Article 28(3) of the ICSID Convention.140  
Parties should agree on the number of conciliators on a Commission and the 
method of their appointment. If they cannot agree, ICSID’s default mechanism will 
apply.141 The Convention sets forth certain requirements regarding the qualifications 
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of appointees to ICSID conciliation Commissions, but the parties are otherwise free to 
choose whomever they wish. All ICSID conciliators must be persons of high moral 
character, of recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or 
finance and who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment. There is no 
nationality requirement in conciliation cases. 142 
The Commission must be constituted as soon as possible after registration of a 
request for conciliation. It is constituted on the date the Secretary-General notifies the 
parties that all conciliators have accepted their appointments.143  
The goal of the Commission is to clarify the issues in dispute between the 
parties and to endeavor to bring about agreement on mutually acceptable terms. The 
parties must cooperate with the Commission in good faith to achieve this goal. To that 
end, the Commission may ask the parties for relevant documents or explanations, hear 
witnesses and experts, make site visits and issue recommendations at any time during 
the proceeding. It may also request evidence from other persons.144 
In numerous cases, a settlement had been agreed between the parties and 
proceedings discontinued by agreement, in some cases proceedings were discontinued 
where payment required under the ICSID Regulations were not duly made.145 
 
3.5. Proposal for Amendment of the ICSID Rules 
In March 2019, the ICSID Center released an update to the proposed 
amendment of its procedural rules for resolving international investment disputes. The 
proposed changes are the most comprehensive in ICSID’s history, encompassing the 
                                                 
142 ICSID Convention Article 14(1) and Article 31(2)  
143 ICSID Conciliation Rule 6(1) 
144 Conciliation Procedure - ICSID Convention Conciliation  [online]. [accessed on 15.2.2019]. 
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Convention-Conciliation-Procedure.aspx 





existing rules for arbitration, conciliation and fact-finding, and introducing a new set 
of mediation rules.146 
Numerous changes are suggested to reduce the time and cost of proceedings; 
for example, making electronic filing the default and enhancing case management by 
tribunals. Under the proposals, parties would also be able to opt into an expedited 
arbitration process that would reduce the length of proceedings by half. The proposals 
also address a range of topics that have been raised by States, legal professionals and 
other stakeholders since the rule amendment project began in late 2016. These topics 
include transparency in the conduct and outcome of proceedings (for example, 
publication of awards, decisions and orders); disclosure requirements for third-party 
funders; and enhanced declarations of independence and impartiality for arbitrators.147 
 
4. Criticism of investment arbitration 
The motive of the states for giving this consent to investor-state arbitration is 
often the desire to attract foreign investors, who demand certainty that their economic 
resources will be safeguarded from hostile actions by the host government.148 
However, while the ability of foreign investors to choose investor state arbitration as 
a mechanism for settling investment disputes has gained relevance, it has also come 
under progressively more scrutiny. The criticism can be classified into two main 
groups, those that question the necessity of the system as such and those focused on 
the functioning of the arbitral procedure. 149 
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Critics point out that the current system allows foreign investors to give private 
arbitrators the ability to decide the legality of sovereign acts, and in practice contracting 
out the judicial function that is embedded in public law. Some have declared that we 
witness the silent rise of a powerful international investment regime that has ensnared 
hundreds of countries and put corporate profit before human right and environment. 
There were concerns about the independence and impartiality of arbitrators, others have 
stressed the imbalances of the system against developing host states, as they are subject 
to most claims and at a higher level than their proportion in global investments. 150 
The arbitration community cannot afford to be complacent about the criticism 
levelled at investment arbitration, nor the requirement for reform. Concerns about 
infringements of state sovereignty, and proceedings brought in abuse of process, might 
to some extent be mollified by the inclusion of tighter definitions in treaty arrangement 
and responsible tribunal decisions. However, concerns might remain about how 
consistently such provisions might be interpreted or how consistently approaches to 
abuse of process might be applied by arbitral tribunals.151 
  UNCTAD has summarized some of the most significant problems of investor-
state arbitration: transparency, as both disputing parties can keep proceedings fully 
confidential even in cases in which the dispute involves public interest matters; 
nationality planning, as investors may gain access to arbitration using corporate 
structuring;  consistency of arbitral decisions, as arbitral tribunals have had divergent 
legal interpretations of identical or similar treaty provisions; limited powers to correct 
erroneous decisions, as there is generally no appeal mechanism and ICSID annulment 
committees have very limited review powers; arbitrators’ independence and impartiality 
as some disputing parties perceive them as biased or profiting from the system through 
repeated appointments; and financial stakes, the high cost of arbitration is a concern, 
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especially small and medium-size enterprises and States. 152 Although the costs are 
affordable to large multinational corporations, they are prohibitive to developing 
countries, which ultimately have to reduce their development budgets, e.g. in education 
or healthcare, in order to meet such costs. 153 
 
4.1. No appeal in substantive issues  
Substantive mistakes of arbitral tribunals, if they arise, cannot be corrected 
effectively through existing review mechanisms. ICSID annulment committees have 
very limited review powers. Furthermore, a committee that is individually created for 
a specific dispute may also disagree with committee(s) examining similar issues in 
other cases. 154 This issue is further explored in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
 
4.2. Transparency and public interest  
The principle of transparency includes but is not limited to: public hearing and 
public access to documents used in court proceedings, the possibility of submissions 
by a third party (amicus curiae), not only other entities of international law, but also 
natural and legal persons, NGOs, experts, resp. expert groups and legal entities. 155 
Although the transparency of the investor-state dispute settlement procedures 
has improved since the early 200s, proceedings can still be kept fully confidential, if 
                                                 
152 Improving Investment Dispute Settlement: UNCTAD Policy. IIA Issue Note, Issue 4, November 
2017. [online]. [accessed on 17.3.2019]. available at 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d8_en.pdf, pg. 6 
153 BANTEKAS, I. An Introduction to International Arbitration. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015., ISBN: 781316275696, pg. 320 
154 Improving Investment Dispute Settlement: UNCTAD Policy.  IIA Issue Note, Issue 4, November 
2017. [online]. [accessed on 17.3.2019]. available at 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d8_en.pdf 
155 BALAŠ, V., KLÁN, T. Transparentnost v řešení sporů v mezinárodním ekonomickém právu. Nové 
trendy odpovědnosti a řešení sporů v mezinárodním právu (vliv nestátních aktérů): studie 
z mezinárodního práva. 1st edition, Prague: Charles University, Faculty of Law, 2012, ISBN: 978-





both disputing parties so wish, even in cases where the dispute involves matters of 
public interest. 156 The critics point out that the investor-state arbitration subjected 
genuine public-law disputes to an arbitral procedural pattern, initially designed for 
purely commercial disputes, which is devoid of democratic legitimacy due to its 
secrecy, non-transparency and ad-hoc nature. 157 
The principles of confidentiality and privacy recognized in international 
commercial arbitration are recognized to some extent in the ICSID Convention. For 
example, Article 48(5) provides that the Centre will not publish awards without the 
parties' consent, but that it may publish excerpts of the legal reasoning in the arbitration 
decisions. Many portions of ICSID arbitration documents are available in the ICSID 
reports or on the ICSID website. However, ICSID's website only contains the most 
recent documents from each case. No case's documents are published in their 
entirety.158 
Several steps have been taken in order to increase transparency in the investor 
state dispute settlement, aiming to improve the knowledge of the dispute, the access to 
the proceedings by non-disputing parties, and the publicity of awards and other arbitral 
documents. A significant departure from the traditional confidential nature was 
introduce in ICSID arbitration through the 2006 revision of the ICISD Arbitration 
Rules. Article 37(2) of the Rules enhanced the public interest dimension of investment 
arbitration by permitting the presence of third parties as amici to the tribunal.  This is 
potentially a significant tool for public interest groups to influence arbitral 
proceedings. However, it is the erosion of the private nature of proceedings by express 
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stipulation in many contemporary BITs, through arbitral transparency clauses, that 
constitutes a radical departure. 159 
Further steps towards transparency were achieved on 1 April 2014, with the 
entry into force of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in treaty-based investor-
state arbitration, and on 10 December 2014, with the adoption of the UN Convention 
on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State arbitration160 (also known as the 
“Mauritius Convention”) which has been in force since 18 October 2017.161 
 It should be noted that even after the last revision of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules, the prohibition of publication of the arbitration award remains unless the parties 
to the dispute agree on such disclosure. This adjustment leaves many question marks 
about what can actually be published (unless the wording effectively disables the 
publication of some documents). The first case, which was already science-based 
under the revised ICSID rules, was Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v United 
Republic of Tanzania.162  
Here, the Tribunal emphasized the fact that public interest is present in 
investment disputes to an extent that justifies a higher level of transparency throughout 
the arbitration. There was also a section on the relationship of transparency and the 
national law of the party to the dispute, and at this level the tribunal is in favor of 
giving priority to national legislation. The Tribunal also accepted the submission of 
the parties to the amici curiae and was also involved in the arbitration award.163 
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4.3. Treaty shopping  
Unacceptable or abusive treaty shopping is a situation where a corporation 
restructures an investment after a dispute has arisen or become foreseeable, to gain 
access to favorable investor-state arbitration for that particular dispute. Essentially, 
abusive treaty shopping involves an investment structure undertaken once a dispute is 
foreseeable, in order to take advantage of the treaty arrangements in place, amounting 
to an abuse of process as recognized in Philip Morris Asia Ltd v Commonwealth of 
Australia. Acceptable treaty shopping occurs when  an investment structure is planned 
in advance so that the investment may benefit from a favorable regulatory 
environment. 164 
This concern was highlighted in the arbitration in wherein Philip Morris Asia 
challenged Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 as amounting to, among 
other things, indirect expropriation or a breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
(FET) standard. Philip Morris Asia acquired all of the shares in Philip Morris 
Australia, so that a claim could be brought under the 1993 BIT between Hong Kong 
and Australia165. The case, therefore, highlighted the possibility of treaty shopping by 
an investor to secure the protection of an investment treaty. The tribunal’s decline of 
jurisdiction in Philip Morris Asia Ltd reflects a willingness on the part of tribunals to 
examine the motivations for corporate structures in the lead-up to a treaty claim and 
perhaps gives some reassurance to states that multinational corporations will not be 
permitted to bring claims where their conduct amounts to an abuse of process.166 
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Those concerns have not been left without a response. For example, the EU 
proposal on the TTIP provides, for the purpose of bringing greater certainty, the rule 
of anti-circumvention in the TTIP Art. 15, which allows the tribunal to prevent treaty 
shopping by declining jurisdiction: in a case where dispute has arisen, or was 
foreseeable on the basis of a high degree of probability, at the time when the claimant 
acquired ownership or control of the investment subject to the dispute and the Tribunal 
determines on the basis of the facts of the case, that the claimant has acquired 
ownership or control of the investment for the main purpose of submitting the claim 
under this Section.  The CETA is equally explicit in preventing treaty shopping in that 
investor claims are rendered inadmissible where the claim arises out of conduct 
amounting to an abuse of process. 167 
 
4.4. Consistency of the decisions  
The obligation of arbitral tribunals to render a reasoned award is contained in 
Article 48(3) of the ICSID Convention: „the award shall deal with every question 
submitted to Tribunal and shall state the reasons upon which it is based“. The 
requirement is reiterated in the Rule 47(1)(i) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. This 
obligation to render a reasoned decision may not be waived by the parties. This is 
consistent with the public international law dimension of the procedure, but also with 
modern arbitral practice in international law. In the ICSID system a failure to state the 
reasons can amount to an annulment of the decision, which reinforces the fundamental 
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character of the obligation to state the reasons on which the award is based. (Article 
52(1) of the ICISD Convention).168 
An important facet of enforcement is the consistency of the case-law and the 
role of precedents. Investment arbitration has largely preserved its ad-hoc nature, 
where judgment have persuasive but no binding authority.169 There is no doubt that 
there is no binding precedent in investment treaty arbitration, as much as there is no 
such rules in general international law. This fundamental principle is included in 
Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention, which provides that the award rendered by the 
arbitral tribunal is binding upon the parties, thus implicitly excluding any precedential 
value to awards rendered under the ICSID Convention. „The ICSID Convention 
provides only that the awards rendered under it are binding on the parties.  170 
One could argue that the public function of investment treaty arbitration 
warrants the development of a consistent body of law, in order, inter alia, to ensure 
predictability and stability. The absence of binding precedent in international 
investment law would, according to certain scholars, undermine the consistency of 
international investment law, and the need for legal predictability in international 
business transactions. Some tribunals have even gone further by arguing that tribunals 
have a duty to contribute to the harmonization of international law. 171 
However, the specificity of investment treaty arbitration does not permit an 
adaptation of the rules applicable to the arbitral procedure, without denaturing the very 
essence of arbitration.  Investment tribunals cannot be expected to act as national 
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courts in hierarchical vertical legal system which function with rules on binding 
precedent or jurisprudence constant. 172 As the tribunal in SGS v The Philippines 
noted, „there is no hierarchy of international tribunals, and even if there were, there is 
no good reason for allowing the first tribunal in time to resolve issues for all later 
tribunals. 173 
International arbitral tribunal are created only to resolve one specific dispute 
between two parties. There is no interconnection between various investment tribunals 
which operate independently of one another. And although the publication has become 
the standard for investment decisions rendered under the ICSID Convention, this is 
not the case for arbitration conducted under other rules. As a consequence, not all 
arbitrators have knowledge of all decisions previously rendered in investment 
disputes.174 The recurring experiences of inconsistent findings by arbitral tribunals 
have resulted in divergent legal interpretations of identical or similar treaty provisions 
as well as differences in the assessment of the merits of cases involving the same facts. 
Inconsistent interpretations have led to uncertainty about the meaning of key treaty 
obligations and lack of predictability as to how they would be read in future cases. 175 
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4.5. Arbitrator’s independence and impartiality  
Under the ICSID Convention, judges are appointed "as the parties shall agree" 
on an ad-hoc basis, without any requirements as to their expertise. 176 The Convention 
requires that the arbitrators need to be persons of high moral character and recognized 
competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied 
upon to exercise independent judgment. 177 Competence in the field of law shall be of 
particular importance in the case of persons on the Panel of Arbitrators. The 
requirement of specialization in international arbitration and public international law 
are not explicitly included as at the time of the drafting and adopting ICSID 
Convention, dispute settlement forum was mainly crafted in view of contract-based 
investment disputes.178  
No person who had previously acted as a conciliator or arbitrator in any 
proceedings for the settlement of the dispute may be appointed as a member of the 
Tribunal. This is based on the general principle that no person should act more than 
once in an investigation of the same dispute.179 This restriction only applies where the 
previous proceedings have actually taken place and may be waived by agreement. I tis 
applicable whoever makes the appointment; whether the parties, the Chairman or other 
appointing authority. 180 
Challenges have historically been rare and have appeared to set a relatively 
high burden of proof for the challenging party: a “manifest” lack of independence and 
impartiality. 181 The increasing number of challenges to arbitrators suggests that 
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disputing parties perceive them as biased or predisposed. Particular concerns have 
arisen from perceived tendency of disputing parties to appoint individuals sympathetic 
to their case. Arbitrators’ interest in being re-appointed in future cases and their 
frequent “changing of hats” (serving as arbitrators in some cases and counsel in others) 
have amplified these concerns. 182  Doubts are particularly pronounced for lawyers 
employed by international law firms.183  
It is also problematic that the arbitration community is relatively small and the 
arbitrators often gain the reputation of being "pro-state" or "pro-investor". On the basis 
of this reputation, they are then selected by the parties to the dispute they wish to have 
in the tribunal of an arbitrator, who is more likely to be opposed to their arguments 
and to defend them in the ruling within the tribunal.184 
Starting with Blue Bank,185 the subsequent cases may have changed the 
landscape for challenges to arbitrators under Article 14(1) and Article 57 of the ICSID 
Convention. Recent qualifications have relied on the “appearance” of a “manifest” lack 
of independence or impartiality, which arguably represents a lower burden of proof.186 
The question is whether these developments are taking ICSID jurisprudence in 
the right direction. Some may argue that Blue Bank and the subsequent 
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disqualifications turn on a desire to dismiss certain arbitrators rather than trying to find 
a substantively new approach. A seemingly less demanding standard may suggest that 
it will be easier to challenge arbitrators going forward. For instance, repeat 
appointment have been the basis for recent challenges. But the rejected challenges in 
for example Abaclat 187 illustrate that not every alleged conflict of interest justifies 
disqualification. 188 
Against this state of affairs is a regulation in CETA prohibiting members of the 
tribunals from "acting as a solicitor, expert appointed by a party or witness in an 
ongoing or new investment dispute under this or other international agreement.”189  
 
4.6. Enforcement of the awards 
Current ISDS is one of the few mechanisms in international law that offers 
effective enforcement. This is guaranteed by the New York Convention  and the ICSID 
Convention, both of which relate to the enforcement of arbitration panel rulings.190 
The ICSID Convention denatures a robust enforcement mechanism and 
provides at Article 54 that each Contracting state shall recognize an award rendered 
pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed 
by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that 
State.191 Such Courts are prohibited from inquiring into the adequacy of the award, 
whether for any procedural defect or for any error on the merits. Rather, the sole 
recourse of an aggrieved award debtor lies in the internal ICSID mechanism for 
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annulment. 192 Arguments have been raised about the adverse impact of compensation 
on the performance of duties by the public authorities. Public finance is not unlimited 
and state liability incurs diversion of public resources to the claimant, which may affect 
the general public. Furthermore, states do not disappear or become insolvent, which 
makes them an attractive target for compensation claims. 193  
The proposed Investment Court System, which will be further discussed, raises 
a question whether it is an arbitration or a judicial authority. The quasi-judicial dispute 
resolution rightly raises doubts as to whether its decisions will be enforceable under 
both New York Convention and ICSID Conventions because they may not be seen as 
arbitration awards. The execution of ICS decisions raises a number of complex 
questions without certain answers. It is therefore possible that national courts, which 
ultimately will be the enforcement authorities of these decisions, may have different 
conclusions, which may cause further uncertainty for investors. 194 
4.7. Prohibitive costs of the proceedings  
In most cases, advance payments for costs of the Tribunal and ICSID fees and 
expenses are requested in equal parts from the parties with the exception of annulment 
proceedings, and the Tribunal decides on the allocation of costs in the award. Unless 
the parties agree otherwise, a Tribunal can allocate the cost of any part of the 
proceeding at any stage,195 without prejudice to its final decision on costs in the 
award.196  The costs in cases governed by the ICSID rules consist of: (i) The parties’ 
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expenses, including the cost of legal representation; (ii) The advances paid to ICSID 
to cover the fees and expenses of arbitrators, conciliators or Committee members, and 
the Centre’s expenses and administrative charges; and (iii) The lodging fee paid by the 
party instituting proceedings. 197 
At the end of the proceeding, the parties are invited to file statements or 
submissions on costs. A statement of costs lists the costs reasonably incurred by a 
party, including the costs of its legal representation, while a submission on costs also 
contains a party’s arguments on how and by whom the costs should be paid.198 
The Tribunal has broad discretion to allocate costs between the parties in the 
final award. It may allocate costs with regard to the proceeding as a whole or with 
regard to a particular part of the proceeding. Its decision in the award becomes binding 
and enforceable. 199 The high cost of arbitrations is a concern for both investors 
(especially small and medium-size enterprises) and States. From a State’s perspective, 
even if it wins the case, the tribunal may refrain from ordering claimants to pay the 
government’s costs, rendering the average of 8 million dollars spent on lawyers and 
arbitrators a significant burden on public finances and preventing the use of those 
funds for other goals. 200 
4.8. Police Powers 
A controversial aspect of investor state arbitration is the fact that it amounts to 
private regulation of state conduct. At the time of the emergence of investor state 
arbitration, such regulation of states was seen as necessary to protect Western investors 
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from expropriation if their investments by developing states, in which there was an 
absence of rule of law and the protections that flow from that.201  
 There has, however, been a shift whereby the mechanisms have increasingly 
been used against developed countries which arguably have robust legal and court 
systems. This shift has been regarded as threatening the abilities of developed 
countries to regulate for the public interest, because of the threat of investor claims for 
indirect expropriation where regulation has adversely affected investment. 202 This 
shift has been regarded as threatening the abilities of developed countries to regulate 
for the public interest, because of the threat of investor claims for indirect 
expropriation where regulation has adversely affected investments. This phenomenon 
has been described as “regulatory chill” whereby governments will refrain from 
regulating for fear of costly investment arbitration, thus restraining the exercise of state 
sovereignty with regard to the environment, health, natural resources and human 
rights, among other policy areas. 203 The imposition of liability may encourage host 
states to change their priorities and become more risk averse and lead them to adopt 
administrative practices or policies that are not optimally in the public interest. States 
are subject to competing demands; therefore, state liability could adversely affect a 
host state’s regulatory powers.204   
While fundamental rights do not appear to be of trade-relevance and there is no 
global endeavor to create a global regime for these universal values, states have 
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realized that compliance with fundamental rights requirements has economic effects 
because it has cost implications, and domestic producers are put at a competitive 
disadvantage if they have to comply with higher standards. 205 For example, the cases 
such as US-Gasoline highlight the trend that when it comes to arbitration involving 
environmental regulations it is typically the host state that is fighting to protect the 
environment against unethical business interests from abroad. This is understandable: 
states are bound by a social contract with their citizens to protect the natural 
environment for long-term macroeconomic growth and social welfare, whereas 
international investors and firms are primarily driven by profit motives. 206207 
The doctrine of legitimate expectations, deduced from the fair and equitable 
treatment standard, may raise separation-of-powers issue: a state may be called to 
account for breaking the promises the executive made also as regards issues coming 
under the legislative’s competence.208 According to the Separate Opinion of Professor 
Brownly in CME v. Czech Republic, it is not “reasonable” that by signing investment 
treaties, the country should accept the risk of national economic disaster and 
“catastrophic repercussion for the livelihood and economic wellbeing of the 
population. Investment treaties are not “an insurance against business risk”. 209 
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The purpose of the states’ margin of appreciation is to preserve regulatory 
autonomy and the free trade system’s legitimacy, since the excessive promotion of free 
trade may suppress local legitimate regulatory policy considerations.210 Yet, other 
sources show that despite common misperceptions, outcomes in ICSID cases are 
balanced amongst States and investors—and this remained true in 2018. Half of the 
thirty-six cases that were concluded in 2018 were settled or otherwise discontinued. 
Of the remaining 18 cases, the tribunal partly or fully upheld claims in 50% of cases, 
dismissed all claims in 33% of cases, and declined jurisdiction in 17% of cases.211 
5. Future of the Dispute Settlement  
There is no single approach to addressing the criticism against the international 
investment regime. However, the treaty practice that has been observed in recent years 
can lead us to the conclusion that the majority of countries do not seem to be against 
international investment arbitration per se, but against the consequences of having 
certain standards broadly defined or the way those standards are interpreted in practice 
by private arbitrators. 212  
We must consider the importance of correctness and fairness of the dispute 
resolution.  In this respect, in the case of investment arbitration, where the arises from 
a dispute between a private party and a State or State entity, some scholars believe that 
legitimacy must prevail.  If a decision impacts more than just two private parties, by 
finally impacting the public at large, the content of the decision and the unfolding of 
the procedure which led to said decision must be subject to higher levels of scrutiny.213 
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Can the investment court proposal for the TTIP and the independent investment 
court system under the CETA be applied to investment treaties more generally?  The 
introduction of new remedies with respect to the award rendered in international 
investment arbitration has been discussed for a long times. However, the legal doctrine 
shares inconsistent views towards this idea. 214 
Some groups view even the purposed inclusion of investor state dispute 
settlement in such “mega-regional” agreements as dangerous, because it would give 
foreign investor access to investor-State arbitration, a forum that is seen as 
inappropriate in legal systems with a strong tradition of rule of law and independent 
and impartial courts. 215  
On the other end of the spectrum, some believe that only a global multilateral 
instrument, generally accepted, could establish the enactment of an international law 
for foreign directs investments. This instrument should be able to transcend and go 
beyond the power relationships existing worldwide. Thus, assuring the stability of the 
multilateral system, it could be the juridical instrument allowing to manage the 
economic globalization in a different way.216 One of the arguments made in favor of 
an investment court is that investment treaty arbitration is characterized as an 
international public law system. It consists of adjudicative panel which determines an 
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issue brought by an individual against the legitimacy of use of power by a sovereign 
nation and to award compensation for illegal state conduct.  217 
 
5.1. Appellate Mechanism 
References to some kind of a new appellate review mechanism continue to 
occur in State practice, especially in the recent mega-regional treaties and 
agreements.218  Finding a balance between the award’s finality and its legitimacy, 
along with the entire arbitral process, must be a subjective exercise. On one hand, there 
is the need for the efficient settlement of disputes and of legal scrutiny. On the other 
hand, there is the need for the efficient settlement of disputes and of legal security.219 
Although a creation of an ICSID appellate mechanism has been debated for a 
long time, it has not come to fruition. ICSID is a well-established and respected 
institution, however, a central appellate body which is an alternative to ICSID could 
be, at a minimum, mooted by the international arbitration community. There are doubts 
about whether such consensus would be achievable, as it would require greater 
harmonization of international investment laws and a uniform approach to 
international standards of legal interpretation. 220  
The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has recommended 
the introduction of such a review for many years. Such a step should then increase the 
consistency of decision-making, its predictability and the legitimacy of a binding 
mechanism to resolve investment disputes. However, it would also be at the expense 
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of the finality of the finding and the speed of the arbitration as opposed by its 
opponents.221 
The discussion regarding a possible new appeal mechanism can be synthesized 
into two main issues – a juridical aspect and a political one. The juridical matter stems 
from the difference between annulment and appeal. It is undisputed that an ad hoc 
Committee has the discretionary power to annul an award, but it may not modify it in 
any way. The ad hoc Committee in the Occidental Petroleum v Ecuador222 case 
endorsed this principle and, after partially annulling the award, it pointed out that the 
committee was required not to amend the award but rather to “substitute the Tribunal’s 
figure of damages with the correct one.”  They found that the ad hoc Committees 
should be entitled to do so, provided the substitution could be performed without 
further submissions from the Parties and without additional marshalling of evidence.  
They cited that basic reasons of procedural economy justify this solution. 
Finally, it reduces the Award by over USD 700 million (approximately 40 percent). 
The ad hoc Committee put forth the argument regarding “procedural economy”. To 
avoid having the parties incur additional cost and delay of going through a second 
investment arbitration, when the correct number could be inserted by the annulment 
committee, after performing a very simple arithmetic calculation and without further 
input from the parties.223  
 
5.2. Investment Court System under TTIP 
The EU has proposed a Permanent Investment Court to be included as a 
measure under the TTIP to address criticism, aimed at investment arbitration.  
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Due to increasing resistance to TTIP, where investment protection and the 
ISDS mechanism became one of the most criticized parts, the Commission announced 
a suspension of investment negotiations in June 2014 and announced a public 
consultation on the investment chapter. In May 2015, the Commission followed up 
with the concept paper TTIP Investment and Beyond: Strengthening Regulatory Right 
and Shift from Current Ad Hoc Arbitration to Investment Court.224 
On November 12, 2015, the European Commission submitted to the United 
States its Official Proposal for the establishment of an “investment court system”. The 
Proposal provides for a two-tiered Tribunal to hear investor-state disputes, consisting 
of a Tribunal of First Instance and an Appeal Tribunal. For TTIP, the Tribunal is 
composed of twenty-one members, who are appointed by the European Union and the 
U.S. rather than by the disputing parties (investor and host state) and are subject to 
stricter rules on independence and impartiality. Furthermore, the Proposal’s 
substantive standards of treatment are designed to ensure policy space for states to 
regulate in the public interest. 225 
Pursuant to the EU’s proposal to the US, 15 members of the arbitral tribunal 
are to comprise the permeant investment court, and they must be appointed when the 
TTIP enters into force. The security of the tenure is anticipated to increase 
independence and impartiality of the judges.226  In particular, five of the judges are to 
be appointed by a Member State of the EU, five by the US and five are to be nationals 
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of third countries. 227  Investment disputes will be decided by a three-member tribunal 
whose composition, like the national courts, will be determined on a rotating basis so 
that the composition of the Chambers is random and unpredictable. Members of the 
Tribunal must have the qualifications required in their country for appointment or be 
recognized lawyers.228 
Similarly, the proposed Appeal Tribunal would be composed of six members 
appointed jointly by the EU and the United States: two EU nationals, two US nationals, 
and two nationals of third countries. The scope of the review allowed is not yet clearly 
defined in the EU textual proposal published online. The following grounds were 
quoted: (a) that the tribunal has erred in interpreting or applying the applicable law in 
the TTIP agreement; (b) that the tribunal has manifestly erred in its understanding of 
the facts; and (c) procedural grounds (i.e. grounds comparable to annulment or set-
aside procedures).229 
While the conclusion of TTIP has become unrealistic with new US 
administration, the ongoing internal EU debate that TTIP has generated has affected 
all other bilateral investment negotiations that the EU has led.230 While the TTIP has 
not materialized, this concept has been also  adopted in the CETA, and if successful, 
is likely to be adopted in other treaty agreements. 231 A failure of TTIP might mean 
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that unreformed current system  persists under existing IIAs between the U.S. and 
some EU members. Nonetheless, the European Parliament has expressed a preference 
for the proposed investment court under the TTIP to be included in other free trade 
agreements. 232 
It should be noted that International investment law is sometimes considered 
to be a hybrid system that stands at the edge of public and private law. Advocates of 
the investment justice system claim that the EU proposal returns protection of foreign 
investment where it originally belongs, back to international public law. 233  
 
5.3. Investment Court System under CETA 
On 30 October 2016, the European Union and Canada signed the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which also includes an 
investment chapter. This chapter is unique in two ways. This is the EU's first 
international investment protection adjustment, and it also includes a completely new 
approach to solving investment disputes known as the investment court system 
(ICS).234 
Notably, the CETA has created a permanent investment tribunal and appellate 
tribunal to hear investor-state disputes under that treaty. The tribunal is to be made up 
of 15 members nominated by Canada and the EU, from which three members will be 
randomly drawn to hear a particular dispute. Hearings will be open to public. The 
appellate tribunal will review decisions of the tribunal’s panels. To facilitate 
consistency of interpretation of CETA provisions the EU and Canada will be able to 
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adopt binding interpretations of those provisions. 235This option also implies a standing 
body with a competence to undertake a substantive review of awards rendered by 
arbitral tribunals. If the facility were constituted of permanent members appointed by 
States from a pool of the most reputable jurists, it would have the potential to become 
an authoritative body capable of delivering consistent and balanced opinions, which 
could rectify some of the legitimacy concerns about the current regime. 236  
In CETA, the EU proposed a very broad scope of review, covering errors in 
interpretation, manifest errors of application plus the current grounds for annulment 
under the ICSID Convention (the latter may include: the tribunal was not properly 
constituted; some fundamental procedural rule was not followed; the tribunal exceeded 
its powers or it did not state the reasons for its award; and finally the award can be 
annulled if there was corruption of one of the tribunal members).237 
Fearing that an agreement containing an "old" ISDS system will not be 
approved in Parliament, the Commission has persuaded Canada to accept the changes 
that essentially meant the adoption of all essential elements of the new approach.238 
CETA will be fully implemented once all EU Member States ratify the deal according 
to their respective constitutional requirements. At the time CETA will take full effect, 
a new and improved Investment Court System will replace the current investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism that exists in many bilateral trade agreements 
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negotiated in the past by EU Member States' governments. The new mechanism will 
be transparent and not based on ad hoc tribunals.239   
 
5.4. Renegotiation of the Current IIAs 
The failure of the DOHA Round of WTO negotiations suggests that, in global 
trade, multilateralism reached its limits and pushed pro-free-trade states towards 
bilateralism (or restricted multilateralism). In parallel to Doha’s failure as to further 
trade liberalization, a complicated network of free trade and investment partnership 
agreements is emerging. 240 Interestingly, investment protection, at least as far as 
substantive standards are concerned, has always remained bilateral, without a realistic 
prospect of a multilateral system during this half-century, this pattern brought about a 
labyrinth network of bilateral arrangements, and investment protection took a life of 
its own. Instead of a duplicate, it became an independent parallel system. 241  
Some of the criticism against the functioning of investor-state arbitration have 
been addressed in the negotiation and renegotiation of the new international 
investment agreements, increasingly conferring an important role on the home state of 
the foreign investor. This is particularly true in relation to problems of interpretations 
of treaty provisions, filtering of claims, regulation of the work of arbitrators, and 
enforcement of awards. 242  
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The shift from investor protection to, arguably, investor power and privilege 
has led some Western nations to opt out of the investor-state dispute settlement 
provisions altogether, or to at least review their investment treaty arrangements with 
respect to dispute settlement. The response of Australian Government, for example, 
was to refuse to agree to change in investment treaties in 20111, subsequently moving 
to a policy of deciding upon dispute settlement provisions in its treaty arrangements 
on a case by case basis. Countries such as Indonesia, Ecuador, Venezuela and South 
Africa have terminated investment treaties. 243 
The major sources of uncertainty are the investment protection treaties’ 
“treatment provisions” including fair and equitable treatment, security and protection, 
non-discrimination and national treatment. These principles center around fluid 
concepts, confer on arbitral tribunals extremely wide powers to review national policy 
decisions and national administrative and judicial proceedings, entailing far reaching 
consequences for states. 244 We are witnessing a tailored modification of selected 
aspects. They include setting time limits for bringing claims, increasing the contracting 
parties’ role in interpreting the treaty, establishing a mechanism for consolidation of 
related claims, providing for more transparency and including a mechanism for an 
early discharge of frivolous claims. Furthermore, clarifying the scope and content of 
substantive provisions will enhance the certainty of the legal norms and reducing the 
margin of discretion of arbitrators. 245 
The new Investment Court System was introduced in some of the bilateral 
treaties between the EU and other states. In April 2018, an investment agreement was 
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announced with Singapore after it was separated from the EU-Singapore trade 
agreement. The most recent country to join the EU in the negotiations with the EU is 
Mexico in the context of modernizing the global agreement. The only negotiating 
partner to be The EU is not yet convinced it is Japan. Currently, ICS is the subject of 
a number of other bilateral investment negotiations conducted by the EU, such as 
Myanmar, China, Indonesia, the Philippines or Tunisia.246  
This also raises new problems. In 2012, only 1.5% of the BITs analyzed 
contained requirements for arbitration qualifications, a positive trend. Doubts arise 
whether a sufficient number of people meeting these criteria will be available. 
Especially for countries like Vietnam or Singapore, it will be difficult to find experts 
among their own citizens who can appoint them to the tribunal. Perhaps for this reason, 
in the later version of ICS, it was added, in addition to the TTIP proposal, that the 
contracting parties may also nominate "their" members of third-country nationals.247 
If we analyses this new generation of treaties, we can see that they give more 
control and stronger involvement to the contracting parties, and notably we find a more 
active participation of the home state in investment disputes, in several roles such as 
the prevention or management of such disputes, the filtering of certain claims, in built-
in treaty mechanisms for interpreting or clarifying provisions, in the regulation of the 
work and conduct of arbitrators, and in the enforcement of arbitral awards.248  
 
5.5. ADR 
Alternative dispute resolution and dispute prevention policies are considered a 
complementary rather than stand-alone avenue for investment dispute settlement 
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reform. Alternative dispute mechanism may be enshrined in IIAs or implemented at 
the domestic level, without specific references in the IIA. They help in reducing the 
number of full-fledged legal disputes, however they probably cannot solve all the key 
challenges. 249 Non-legal methods can be used to resolve a dispute at each stage of the 
proceedings, even after a final and binding decision is issued. 250 
There has been some activity within the relevant institutions focusing on 
investment dispute resolution. As a matter of example, the Energy Charter Conference 
adopted the Guide on Investment Mediation in July 2016.  The recent negotiations 
related to the trade agreements between the EU, the USA and Canada have further 
shown that the relevant stakeholders are paying a lot of attention to mediation. It plays, 
at least nominally, a significant role in the respective investment chapters of the 
mentioned tools.251 For example the text CETA provides for mediation of 
investor‑State disputes: The disputing parties may at any time agree to have recourse 
to mediation.252 
Under TTIP, the institutionalization of the pre-trial phase would also include the 
amicable resolution phase before the consultation phase. The TTIP proposal has three 
articles dedicated to alternative dispute resolution. The first step in dispute settlement 
is the amicable resolution, before starting consultation proceedings. As opposed to 
other agreements, the Commission proposes to introduce a notification procedure in 
the TTIP, whereby the parties have to formally announce any solutions that are 
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mutually agreed to during this amicable resolution phase. The consultation procedure 
can only start if amicable resolution has failed.253 
The confidentiality of mediation makes it difficult to assess whether it is already 
playing a role in diverting disputes from arbitration. Depending on the applicable rules, 
parties may be required to keep confidential documents exchanged during mediation, 
the outcome or settlement terms, or even the fact that the mediation is taking place. 254 
Once used in investor-state disputes, mediation might bring substantive 
advantages for both investors and States. Instead of decision, it brings solutions. Thus, 
unless the investors are only seeking for satisfaction in punishment, they should 
appreciate having the compensation in as early stage as possible. Furthermore, 
settlement usually prevents the complications that are common in relation to the 
enforcement of an award. 255 
5.6. Comparison of ICSID and WTO  
The Uruguay Round engineered the birth of a new trade system under the aegis 
of a new justice organization, the WTO. The new dispute settlement mechanism 
restores and strengthens the original GATT dispute settlement process by making it 
more automatic and introducing specific time limits on procedures. Requests for panels 
on alleged violations are approved more automatically, as are the panel reports, the 
appellate body reports and the authorizations of retaliation. Instead of requiring a 
positive consensus to proceed, they now need a negative consensus to fail to 
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proceed.256  ICSID Investment treaty arbitration is a decentralized ad hoc legal system 
of dispute settlement. It can be compared with other dispute settlement bodies, such as 
the system stablished under the World Trade Organization, which also functions with 
ad hoc panels but has an appeal mechanism, the WTO Appellate Body.257  
The WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS) and the ICSID investor-state 
dispute settlement system differ in three main aspects. First while the DSS arbitrates 
only between States Parties to the WTO, the ICSID allows for individual investors to 
bring cases directly against signatory states. Second, the DSS is constituted as part of 
the WTO multilateral regime, which provides more substantive and consistent 
regulations compared to those generally supplied by the myriad treaties that are the 
main sources of law applied under the ICSID. Third, the DSS sets up a number of 
permanent judicial bodies staffed by senior international legal experts who possess 
greater capacity for building upon precedents, compared to ICSID tribunals where 
independent arbitrators are appointed on an ad-hoc basis. 258 
The new investment court system proposed under CETA is designed as a two-
stage quasi-judicial system consisting of a first-instance 15-member tribunal and a six-
member tribunal. Thus, the structure at first glance recalls the dispute settlement 
system of the WTO, the top of which is the Appellate Body with seven members 
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appointed by the WTO Membership. Its use as a model for ICS has its advocates and 
opponents.259 
However, under the WTO system, only government can bring cases to the 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and poor governments will be disproportionately 
deterred by the prospect of antagonizing more powerful countries, on whom they 
depend in non-trade matters, such as defense or foreign aid. By convention, no 
compensation is paid by the loser for a violation, after a process that can still take over 
two years to complete, a fact that bears more heavily on poor states than on rich ones. 
If a country does not take measures to comply with its WTO obligations, there is no 
centralized sanction. The only sanction is retaliation. Since all economic sanctions are 
costly to the initiator, the ability of a poor country to sanction a rich on is much less 
than in the reverse. 260 
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Investor-state dispute settlement has been the subject of a complex debate in 
both the investment community and the general public at large. The current debate 
tries to describe the interaction between trade and local public interest, the relationship 
between regulatory sovereignty and the settlement of international trade disputes and 
the controversial issue of international investment protection and investor-state 
arbitration. While some states reverted to protectionism, others considered free trade 
as a way-out from current economic crises. This resulted in a new generation of free 
trade agreements, such as the TTIP and CETA. 261 
Despite all the criticism against investment arbitration, ICSID remains 
effective international institution making an important contribution to the international 
community. It also remains the most popular institution in investment arbitration 
among both investors and States and, importantly, also the most transparent. 262 In the 
recent years there has been increased attention to procedural and substantive aspects 
of ICSID’s arbitral process and the voices of discontent and the calls for change should 
not be ignored. 263  On substance, there has been a significant debate as to the 
desirability of consistency in the findings of arbitral tribunals dealing with similar legal 
issues, and consideration of whether there may be a need for additional post-award 
mechanisms to address such considerations. 264  
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The advantages of a new appeal mechanism could prove to silence some of the 
criticism generally levelled against investment arbitration and with the appropriate 
design, it could be faster, more transparent, less costly than the current annulment 
remedy. 265 An investment arbitration appellate body could ensure a consistent 
approach to investor state dispute settlement, drawing on the creation of an 
independent investment court system under the CETA. These developments are 
particularly important with regard to issues involving the infringement on state 
sovereignty or abuse of process by investors. Such feature would be likely to make 
Investor-State dispute settlement more palatable for States, in part because of the 
possibility of consistency and predictability with regard to awards.  
Another option implies the replacement of the current system of ad hoc 
arbitration tribunals with a standing international investment court, which could also 
have an appeals chamber. The court would consist of judges appointed or elected by 
States on a permanent basis, e.g. for a fixed term.  The concept of a permanent legal 
body providing public proceedings and decisions, establishing binding case law to 
address international investment disputes, is not a novel one, although it has not been 
put into action yet. This concept has been partially adopted in the CETA, and if 
successful, is likely to be adopted in other treaty agreements. 266 Some scholars believe 
that such permanent investment court would address most of the problems as it would 
go a long way toward ensuring the legitimacy and transparency of the system, 
facilitating the consistency and accuracy of decisions and promoting the independence 
and impartiality of adjudicators. 
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However, there are also arguments against such system. Establishing an 
investment court could take investment arbitration into uncharted waters with 
uncertain rules. It departs from a private view of investment law. Instead, it fosters the 
public law model with rules on third party participation, transparency, focus on the 
entitlement to regulate by states and enhances institutionalization. 267 At the same time, 
the ICS concept raises a number of new doubts. Above all, it is not clear to what extent 
ICS will be practically usable for investors. With a possibility of an appeal, 
management can become lengthy and therefore less attractive to investors. In addition, 
there is a risk that the final decision in favor of the investor will not be enforceable 
outside the territory of the Contracting Parties. All these uncertainties might lead 
investors to restructure their investments in such a way as to initiate traditional 
arbitration under earlier investment agreements. 268    
Dispute settlement mechanism remains one of the politically most sensitive 
issues, given the stakes of national regulatory sovereignty and an appeal for 
substantive investment protection. It will be crucial to have a possibility to analyze the 
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Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law – Selected Aspects 
 
Abstract 
At the time of the emergence of investor state arbitration, such regulation of states was 
seen as necessary to protect Western investors from expropriation of their investments 
by developing states, in which there was an absence of rule of law and the protections 
that flow from that. The ICSID Center was established primarily to ensure the 
availability of an assured impartial and independent dispute resolution service. The 
increase in the number of cases over the years, together with sometimes expansive, 
unexpected and inconsistent interpretations of International Investment Agreement 
provisions by tribunals, had triggered a worldwide debate and a number of countries 
had adopted reform measures. The EU has proposed a Permanent Investment Court to 
address criticism, aimed at investment arbitration and to be included as a measure 
under the TTIP. This concept has been also  adopted in the CETA, and if successful, 
is likely to be adopted in other treaty agreements as the European Parliament has 
expressed a preference for the proposed investment court under the TTIP to be 
included in other free trade agreements. The concept of a permanent legal body 
providing public proceedings and decisions, establishing binding case law to address 
international investment disputes, is not a novel one, although it has not been put into 
action yet.  This option implies the replacement of the current system of ad hoc 
arbitration tribunals with a standing international investment court, which could also 
have an appeals chamber. The court would consist of judges appointed or elected by 
States on a permanent basis, e.g. for a fixed term. The advantages of a new appeal 
mechanism could prove to silence some of the criticism generally levelled against 
investment arbitration. It would address most of the problems as it would go a long 
way toward ensuring the legitimacy and transparency of the system, facilitating the 
consistency and accuracy of decisions and promoting the independence and 
impartiality of adjudicators. 
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V době vzniku mezinárodní investiční arbitráže byla taková regulace státy považována 
za nezbytnou k ochraně západních investorů před vyvlastněním jejich investic ze 
strany rozvojových států. V těchto státech nebyly vytvořeny dostatečné právní normy 
a ochrana, která z nich plyne. Centrum ICSID bylo zřízeno především proto, aby byla 
zajištěna dostupnost nestranného a nezávislého řešení sporů. Nárůst počtu případů v 
průběhu let, spolu s někdy rozsáhlými, neočekávanými a nekonzistentními 
interpretacemi ustanovení mezinárodních dohod o investicích ze strany ad hoc 
tribunálů vyvolal celosvětovou diskusi a řada zemí přijala reformní opatření. Evropská 
unie navrhla Stálý investiční soud, který je reakcí na kritiku mířenou na investiční 
arbitráži a který by měl být zařazen jako jedno z opatření v rámci Transatlantického 
obchodního a investičního partnerství.  Tato koncepce byla také přijata v Komplexní 
hospodářské a obchodní dohody mezi EU a Kanadou, a pokud bude úspěšná, bude 
pravděpodobně přijata v dohodách dalších. Evropský parlament je otevřený tomu, aby 
byl navrhovaný investiční soud zařazen i do budoucích dohod o volném obchodu. 
Tento koncept stálého právního subjektu, který poskytuje veřejná řízení a rozhodnutí 
a zavádí závaznou judikaturu pro řešení mezinárodních investičních sporů, není nový, 
přestože dosud nebyl uveden do praxe. Tato možnost předpokládá nahrazení 
stávajícího systému rozhodčích tribunálů ad hoc stálým mezinárodním investičním 
soudem, který by mohl mít také odvolací senát. Soud by se skládal ze soudců 
jmenovaných nebo volených státy trvale, např. na dobu určitou. Výhody nového 
odvolacího mechanismu by mohly být řešením kritiky, která směřuje proti 
investičnímu arbitráži. Vyřešil by tak mnoho problémů, například zajištěním legitimity 
a transparentnosti systému, usnadněním jednotnosti a přesnosti rozhodnutí a podporou 
nezávislosti a nestrannosti rozhodců. 
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